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The future, and what might have been
R. A. Briggs1 • G. A. Forbes2
 The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication
Abstract We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’—
laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a
problem for the Growing-Block view. We begin with the framework given in Briggs
and Forbes (in The real truth about the unreal future. Oxford studies in metaphysics.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that
the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and
a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We show how
objective chances might ground a more fine-grained concept of feasibility, and
furnished a places in the structure where causation and dispositions might fit. The
Growing-Block view, thus understood, provides the resources to explain the close
link between modality and tense, so that it predicts modal change as time passes.
This account lets us capture not only what the future might hold for us, and also
what might have been.
Keywords Growing-Block  Laws  Counterfactuals  Chance  Dispositions 
Causation
Imagine finding yourself nostalgic; you recall a time in your life when the future
still seemed wide open. You wonder ‘what if I had done something else?’. The
move from the open future to the possible past seems a very natural one, and it
would be useful for the philosophy of time to explain the link between tense and
modality. The kind of modality that interests us shows up in a variety of concepts:
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laws of nature, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, chance, and of course, the
concept of nomological possibility. We shall refer to the collection of categories that
are modal (in the relevant sense) as the nomological package.1
One theory that offers to explain the link between tense and modality is the
Growing-Block view, which appeals to metaphysical claims about time (in
particular, the claims that only past and present things and events exist, and that
the passage of time consists of new things coming into existence) to capture a modal
intuition (that possibilities in the future are different from possibilities in the past).
The future is open; the past is not. Any defender of the Growing-Block view should
be most interested in ‘what if’, ‘will’ and ‘would have’.
Our aim, then, is to show how the Growing-Block view gives us the resources to
talk about certain elements of the nomological package—in particular, laws,
counterfactuals, and chance. Section 1 briefly lays out the Growing-Block view, as
developed in Briggs and Forbes (2012). We won’t attempt a defense of the view
here, but extended defenses can be found in Broad (1923), Tooley (1997), Button
(2006), Correia and Rosenkranz (2013), and Forbes (2016). Section 2 explains how
the view can be combined with a non-Humean account that fits central elements of
the nomological package together.
1 The Growing-Block view
The Growing-Block view has two central commitments: first, that past and present
events and things exist, while future events and things do not; and second, that the
passage of time consists of new events and things coming into existence. Thus, it is
essentially a dynamic view, on which the ontology of the world undergoes a
fundamental change as time passes. We claim that on the Growing-Block view,
what is possible undergoes a fundamental change as well. We will rely on the
version of the view we developed in Briggs and Forbes (2012).
1.1 A summary of the Briggs–Forbes view
Although there are no future events or things, there are non-trivial truths about the
future. These truths are made true by events and things in the past and present, plus
the laws of nature (Briggs and Forbes 2012, 298). Truths about the future can be
characterized using ersatz possible worlds called timelines, modelled on the worlds
of Adams (1974).
While the actual world—the one that is continually growing as time passes—is a
collection of concrete times arranged in a temporal order, ersatz timelines are
collections of abstract times arranged in temporal order. These ersatz timelines are
static and unchanging. As time passes, a series of different ersatz timelines come to
represent the same growing concrete world, and then cease to fully represent it
(though they still represent proper parts of it).
1 This list is representative, but may not be exhaustive; see Sect. 2.6.
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Each possible concrete time can be represented by an ersatz time, a set of tensed
atomic propositions in a suitably ideal language. (We can think of these propositions
as consisting of n-place predicates applied to names.) We built a larger language L,
consisting of
• names a; b; c; . . .;
• variables x; y; z; . . .;
• n-place predicates (for arbitrary n) R11;R
2








2; . . .; . . .
• the connectives ^, _; :; and ;
• tensed quantifiers 8 and 9,
• tenseless quantifiers R and P, and
• tense operators, including the past and future operators P and F
Tensed propositions in L take their truth values relative to both a time and a
timeline (What is true simpliciter at a timeline is what is true at the present—the last
moment in the timeline).2
One ersatz timeline is actualized—i.e., accurately represents all and only the
things in the concrete actual world. Other ersatz timelines are feasible—they not
only accurately represent the concrete actual world, but also things and events that
may come to exist in the future. Timelines can be parts of other timelines, and every
feasible timeline has the actualized timeline as a part: the actualized timeline forms
the initial segment of every feasible timeline. If T is an initial segment of T, we say
that T is an extension of T.
Each timeline, when taken together with all of its feasible extensions, generates a
tree-like model structure composed of partially overlapping timelines. Figure 1
depicts the actualized timeline, together with its feasible extensions, as are truncated
branches of a tree which begin at the root, but need not extend all the way outward
to a leaf. The actualized timeline runs from e0 to e1. One feasible timeline runs from
e0 to e2 and stops; another runs from e0 all the way to e3.
3
We drew further distinctions among the timelines in the branching structure.
Some are incomplete, and must continue growing, while others, after their final big
crunch or whathaveyou, are incomplete and can grow no more. Timelines that could
end where they are, but could be continued, are semi-complete.
Some timelines in the branching structure are ‘histories’—either complete
timelines, or semi-complete timelines viewed ‘as histories’. Intuitively speaking,
histories are maximally specific ways the original timeline could turn out. Histories
are classical—at every time in every history, every proposition is either true or false.
Conjunction, negation, and the universal and existential quantifiers take their usual
classical semantic values, and tense are given Priorian modal definitions P and F (so
2 The ersatz time that we have been treating as present could in fact be the limiting case of the past. That
is, it could be that what is true at the present moment is whatever is true at some time span that is not
succeeded by any other time span, and true at all shorter time spans that are not succeeded by any other
time span. (On this way of speaking, you are now reading a paper about time because you’ve been reading
a paper about time for the last minute, and the last 30 s, and the last 15 s … and so on.) Treating the
present as the limit of the past should work for most practical purposes.
3 We use e for ersatz times, to emphasize their difference from concrete times.
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that, for example, P/ is true at a time in a history whenever / is true at at least one
earlier time in that history, and F/ is true at a time in a history whenever / is true at
at least one later time).
We propose three possible ways of extending this classical definition to obtain a
definition of truth at a time in an arbitrary timeline, but for simplicity’s sake, we will
adopt the supervaluational semantics, modeled after Stalnaker and Thomason
(1970), here. A sentence is true at an ersatz time e in a timeline T if it is true at e in
every history that is a feasible extension of T, false at e in T if it is false at e in every
history that is a feasible extension of T, and indeterminate otherwise.4
This should suffice as enough background for the work we intend to do. In the
next subsection, we will outline the elements of the nomological package that we
think the Growing-Block theory is best poised to explain, and say how a Growing-
Block theorist ought to model them.
2 A non-Humean account of the nomological package
The nomological package is a collection of intertwined modal concepts. In our
(2017) we argued that a Growing-Block theory of future truth is incompatible with
Humeanism—the claim that facts about elements of the nomological package (such
as laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, and chances) supervene on non-
nomological facts. So a Growing-Block theorist must appeal to fundamental
modality. What can Growing-Block theorists say about this fundamental modality to








Fig. 1 The actual timeline and its feasible timelines
4 In this paper, we will focus on models in which there are a finite number of times, and we will ignore
the ‘inevitability’ operators from our earlier account, which create special complications.
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Quite a lot, we think. The remainder of this section lays out a model of modality
for Growing-Block theorists. We understand laws as true sentences in a timeless
language, whose truth is grounded by parts of reality called lawmakers (Sect. 2.1),
use the laws to define the modality of feasibility (Sect. 2.2), and analyze (non-
backtracking causal) counterfactuals in terms of feasibility (Sect. 2.3). We explain
how this basic picture can be modified to leave room for chances (Sect. 2.4), as well
as causation and dispositions.
Figure 2 depicts grounding relations among the concepts we discuss; an arrow
from A to B means that A grounds B. For causation and dispositions, we suggest
several alternative options, drawn in grey, and in parentheses: they might function
as lawmakers, or be phenomena susceptible to analysis in counterfactual terms. Or
causation might play a completely different role, either grounding or being
grounded by feasibility.
We don’t purport to offer a complete theory of any one element of the
nomological package, although we will have novel things to say about laws,
counterfactuals, and chance. Rather, our chief aim is to show how these separate
pieces fit together into a harmonious picture, unified by the Growing-Block view.
2.1 Laws
To fully capture the concept of laws, we will need to make one modification to our
earlier account. There are truths about the laws of nature, and these truths are
arguably logically and metaphysically contingent. We will therefore assume that
each ersatz timeline contains, in addition to an ordered sequence of times, a










Fig. 2 Relations of grounding
among elements of the
nomological package
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In our (2012) we defined our valuation function for tensed propositions, but the
laws are timeless. Therefore, we will need to formulate a theory of tenseless
propositions, which take their truth values at worlds alone. While ersatz times were
sets of tensed sentences (which, intuitively, describe the world from the perspective
of a particular time), our ersatz laws are tenseless sentences (which, intuitively,
describe all the times from an outside, God’s-eye perspective.)
We can modify the language L to create a language L of laws. The vocabulary
of L consists of the vocabulary of L plus
• the symbol at,
• tenseless quantifiers Pe and Re that range over times, and
• the two-place predicates E (earlier) and L (later)
We can recursively define a well-formed formula in L as follows.
• if / is a wff of L not containing any names, then /ate is a wff of L.5
• if / and w are wffs of L, then / ^ w, / _ w, and :/ are wffs of L
• if / is a wff of L, then Px/ and Rx/ are wffs of L.
• if / is a wff of L, then Pe/ and Re/ are wffs of L.
• if e1 and e2 are variables for times, then Ee1e2 and Le1e2 are wffs.
So each timeline includes a collection of timeless laws, alongside its sequence of
ersatz times. If the timeline is to count as possible, the laws must be well-behaved.
They must be closed under logical consequence (though they need not be complete,
since not every matter is settled by the laws). They must also play nicely with the
sequence of ersatz times: they must not be false of the block as that sequence
represents it. It’s slightly tricky to get the right meaning for ‘false of’, as the
following example illustrates.
Consider a timeline T in which there are three ersatz times, a1, a2, and a3.
Suppose T’s laws include the following sentence.
(LT) Pe1Re2ðLe1e2Þ
‘For all every time e1, there is a time e2 which is later than e1.’
In the schematic example, we do not want to say the sequence of times represents
a state of affairs that is inconsistent with (LT). The block as T represents it is
consistent—while a3 isn’t yet succeeded by any time, the block will grow to ensure
that it is. The present is going to be succeeded by a later time, even if that later time
hasn’t yet come into existence.
We can define what it is for a law to be false of a sequence of ersatz times using a
two-stage procedure. First, we can give a standard Tarskian definition for ‘true of’.
We can talk (a little loosely) of assigning names and ersatz times (rather than
concrete individuals and times) to variables in open sentences of L. We can then
5 We require that the laws be name-free on the grounds that laws are general, and do not make references
to particular individuals. ‘No olive tree produces apples’ is a candidate law (or at least, it’s not barred
from the status of law due to its form). ‘No tree in Olivia’s orchard produces apples’ is not a candidate
law, because it mentions Olivia by name.
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say that /ate is true relative to an assignment of variables at a sequence of times iff
replacing the variables in / with the appropriate names yields a sentence that is true
at the time assigned to e in T. (The truth values of more complex sentences are given
recursively.) In our example, (LT) is not true of our sequence of times, since if we
assign a3 to the variable e1, there is no way of assigning a time to the variable e2 that
will make the open sentence Le1e2 come out true in T.
Next, we can say that a sentence of L is false of a sequence of times if and only
if it is not true of any extension of that sequence of times—i.e., just in case it will
never become true. In or example, (LT) is not false of our sequence of times. A law
is consistent with a sequence of ersatz times so long as it is not false of the sequence
of ersatz times.
The apparatus developed so far lets us define the concepts of completeness, semi-
completeness, and incompleteness we glossed in Sect. 1. We can say that a timeline
is complete just in case its laws are true of it, but not true of any other extension of
it; semi-complete just in case its laws are true of it and some of its other extensions;
and incomplete if its laws are true of some of its extensions but not true of it.
So far, our discussion has been at the level of ersatz timelines—representations of
ways the world might be. But ersatz timelines represent the concrete world, and can
represent it either truly or falsely. We have an intuitive grasp on the truthmakers for
tensed sentences: they are concrete things located at times, such as tables and chairs,
cats and donkeys, cabbages and kings, that a tensed sentence can represent
accurately or inaccurately. But what are the lawmakers—the features of the world
that the laws can represent accurately or inaccurately?
We think the Growing-Block theorist has a variety of appealing options. The
lawmakers might be dispositions (see Sect. 2.5 below), Aristotelian natures (see
Cartwright 1999, 77–103), or capacities of individuals. They might be primitive
facts picked out by structural equations (see Pearl 2009). Or they might not be
nameable at all, except by pointing to the laws, and saying that lawmakers are
whatever parts of reality make the laws true. In our (2017) we argued that for
Growing-Block theorists, the lawmakers cannot be Humean entities. But that leaves
plenty of space open for a positive characterization. What we have said here places
very few constraints on the nature of lawmakers. But whatever the lawmakers are,
they must constrain how the block grows.
2.1.1 Objection: are we fundamentalists?
We claim that our view of laws is admirably tolerant of the diverse opinions held by
metaphysicians: all sorts of entities are qualified to be lawmakers, provided that they
are strong enough to constrain the future. But objectors from some quarters might
complain that our theory is too narrow. Why must laws constrain the future, instead
of merely guiding it? These objectors side with (Cartwright 1999, 4), who claims
that
1. our best scientific theories are true only in limited domains,
2. scientific laws hold only ceteris paribus, and
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3. laws lack the special epistemic status that some philosophers of science
attribute to them: our knowledge of laws is less secure than our knowledge of
the natures of things.
Cartwright’s third point need not detain us; our Growing-Block theory concerns
the metaphysics of laws, and says nothing about their epistemology. But her first
and second points constitute a serious challenge. We have assumed that the laws of
a timeline are true of the entire timeline (thus directly contradicting Cartwright’s
first claim), and that they are (nomologically) necessarily true (thus directly
contradicting her second claim).
One possibility, of course, is that Cartwright’s claims 1 and 2 are wrong. Her
critics have marshaled a variety of arguments against 1 and 2. Mumford (2000) and
Chakravartty (2003) point out that 1 and 2 are underdetermined by the scientific
evidence, and that a priori considerations weigh against them. Teller (2002)
questions two of the tacit premises in Cartwright’s argument for claim 1—that
scientific explanation proceeds from a relatively small stock of interpretive models,
and that each of these models is naturally limited in its domain—adducing that these
premises are at odds with Cartwright’s evidence. Winsberg and Frisch (2000) argue
that, contrary to claim 2, Cartwright’s ceteris paribus laws can be converted into
exceptionless laws with provisos as part of their content.
Even if 1 and 2 are true, however, there is no need to abandon the Growing-Block
account. Cartwright does not argue for wholesale anti-realism about the nomolog-
ical package. In fact, as she notes, scientific realism provides a good explanation for
the success of our scientific theories. Rather, she claims that laws, as formulated in
the language of current science and its most deserving successors, are neither
unconditional (true necessarily, and not just ceteris paribus) nor unrestricted
(applicable in all domains).
This leaves it open that there is some logically ideal language in which
unconditional, unrestricted laws can be formulated. (Cartwright doubts that such
laws would be simple or explanatory, but nothing we say requires the laws to be
either.) Indeed, one of Cartwright’s reasons for thinking that the laws are not true is
that the language in which they are couched has imprecise application conditions
which are impossible to codify.
Were there a notional language whose application conditions were precise, then
there would be no obstacle to our formulating laws in that language. Granted, no
living person speaks such a language, but as modal ersatzists, we are already
committed to its existence. We think there are facts of the matter about which
possibilities there are. For ersatzists, such facts can only obtain if there is some
language in which complete descriptions of the world can be formulated, and
something about the language that fixes which of those descriptions are consistent.
While the language of our timelines is most likely not a language spoken by
contemporary scientists, it must exist in some sense if the ersatzist view of modality
is true.
R. A. Briggs, G. A. Forbes
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2.2 Feasibility
Philosophers are often interested in the restricted modal operators feasibility and
nomological possibility. Growing-Block theorists can adopt a standard account of
restricted modality: the R possibilities (where R can be filled in with ‘nomological’,
‘feasible’, or something else) are just the logical possibilities where some additional
proposition is true. We can then characterize feasibility in terms of laws:
nomologically possible timelines are those where the actual laws of nature hold.
But there is a crucial ambiguity here: do the actual laws hold in every nomologically
possible world where they are true, or only in those worlds that have the status of laws?
Humeans typically pick the first answer—the nomological possibilities are those in
which the actual laws are true—because they are committed to the nomological
possibility of undermining futures: sequences of events permitted by the actual laws that
would fix different laws if they occurred. We are not bound by the strictures of
Humeanism, so will say that the nomological possibilities are only those timelines in
which the actual laws are laws. (We could, alternatively, make the two interpretations
coincide by enriching the language of the laws to include a nomological necessity
operator h, and stipulating that h/ is a law if and only if / is a law.)
Feasible timelines are those that share both their history and their laws with the
actual timeline. Feasibility is a particularly interesting modality because, on our
version of the Growing-Block view, the laws and the past are fixed, while the future
is open. So there is an important sense in which the feasible timelines are really
possible—they might become actual as the block grows. Feasible timelines represent
not merely counterparts of our actual world, but genuine possibilities for us.
2.3 Counterfactuals
Once we have a concept of feasibility, we can use it to analyze counterfactuals—or
at least a certain subset of them. English-language counterfactuals run the gamut
from ‘If Emmy Noether and Sophie Germain were compatriots, then Noether would
be French’ to ‘If I had jumped out my office window, I would have to have installed
a net earlier to make sure that I would survive’ to ‘If there were only a finite number
of primes, then it would be easier to sort marbles into groups of uniform size’ to ‘If
you were to drop salt in water, then it would dissolve’. Not all of these
counterfactuals are relevant to the nomological package.
Here, we are chiefly interested in non-backtracking counterfactuals whose
antecedents are about events at a particular time. The Noether/Germain counter-
factual in our list of examples is not of central interest, because its antecedent is not
about the events at any particular time, but is instead about a global feature of the
world; similarly for the prime numbers/marbles counterfactual. The window
counterfactual is also not of central interest, because on its charitable reading, it
backtracks, or ascribes a kind of non-causal dependence of the past on the future.
We are most interested in counterfactuals like the salt/water example, which are
laden with a type of causal nomological modality.
Following an idea pioneered by Stalnaker (1968) and Stalnaker and Thomason
(1970), we will adopt a selection semantics for counterfactuals. The selection
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semantics is a possible worlds semantics in two senses: counterfactuals are
classified as true or false at possible worlds, and their truth conditions are
characterised in terms of possible worlds. Since our timelines resemble traditional
possible worlds in some but not all respects, we will use ‘world’ for the entities in
the traditional picture, and ‘timeline’ for the entities we ourselves are committed to.
Throughout this section we will use the term ‘actual’ to designate the world or
timeline at which the counterfactual is evaluated. (Since we have no reason to
rigidly designate the timeline that authors and readers alike inhabit, the gain in ease
of exposition outweighs the risk of confusion.)
The basic idea is this: the selection function maps each world w and antecedent
A to a set of ‘A worlds’—i.e., worlds where A is true. (To see how the world would
have been if A were true, we make the smallest possible change to the actual world
that will ensure A’s truth, and then consider all that this change entails.) The
counterfactual Ah!C (‘if A had been the case, then C would have been the case’)
is true at w if C is true at all the selected A worlds, and false at w if C is false at all
the selected A worlds. It’s controversial what happens when the selected worlds
disagree about C’s truth value. Lewis (1973) claims that in this case, the entire
counterfactual is false at the actual world, while Stalnaker (1981) says that it is
neither true nor false. We adopt a version of Stalnaker’s view: the selection function
maps each timeline T and antecedent A to a set of timelines, and Ah!C is true at a
timeline T if C is true at all the selected timelines, false at T if C is false at all the
selected timelines, and indeterminate otherwise.
So far, what we have said applies to all counterfactuals. But how shall we choose
the selected timelines? Here, we shift our focus to the specific case of non-
backtracking counterfactuals whose antecedents are about events at a particular
time. Examples might include:
• If Mary Anning had been killed by the lightning that struck her in 1800,
Plesiosaurs would have remained unknown in England in 1821.
• If Empress Jia Nanfeng had kept Crown Prince Sima Yu under house arrest
instead of having him assassinated, then she would have maintained her
position of power within the Jin Dynasty for several more years.
• If you had kept the oven closed, the souffle´ would not have fallen.
In each of these non-backtracking counterfactuals, the antecedent concerns (but
need not mention explicitly) a specific time: 1800 in the first case; 300 AD (the year
of Sima Yu’s death) in the second; and the time of the souffle´’s cooking in the third.
The Growing-Block theory suggests a ‘branching time’ account of such
counterfactuals, of the sort developed by Thomason and Gupta (1981), defended
by Leitgeb (2011a, b) and Loewer (2007), and discussed but ultimately rejected by
Lewis (1979).6
6 This theory could be embedded in a more general theory of counterfactuals. There are counterfactuals
whose antecedents are not about any particular time, but about a proposition that could be made true by a
variety of events at different times, such as:
• If Maryam Mirzakhani or Tupac Shakur had lived longer, then the world would contain more
beautiful artifacts.
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In metaphoric terms, our preferred interpretation of the selection function treats
the Growing-Block like a stick of celery, with the earlier times nearer the base, and
the later times towards the tip. Imagine the tip has gone bad: the antecedent of the
counterfactual has turned out false. In order to get an idea of what the celery would
look like healthy (with the antecedent true), you might cut off the soggy bits towards
the tip, saving as much of the healthy celery as you can, and then imagine how the
celery would regrow healthily.
To a first formal approximation, the procedure for evaluating a counterfactual
Ah!C at a timeline T, where A concerns a particular time span, can be broken
down into four steps.
1. Find a time eA, located shortly before the beginning of the span.
2. Remove all the parts of the timeline after eA—thus generating a pruned timeline
that represents the concrete block the way it was before it grew large enough
furnish a falsemaker (or truthmaker) for the antecedent.
3. Consider all the feasible extensions of this shorter timeline—all the ways the
concrete block might have grown—in which A is true. The timelines generated
by this method are our selected timelines.
4. If C is true in all of the resulting timelines, then Ah!C is true in the original
timeline; if C is false in all of the resulting timelines, then Ah!C is false in
the original timeline; otherwise, Ah!C is neither true nor false.
The above procedure is an approximation, because it is important that the set of
selected timelines be non-empty. What happens where there are no feasible
timelines that coincide with the actual timeline up to eA in which A is true? In this
case, defender of branching-time counterfactuals faces a tricky choice. She can
Footnote 6 continued
This counterfactual is intimately connected to two others, whose antecedents are about events at par-
ticular times.
• If Maryam Mirzakhani had lived longer, then the world would contain more beautiful artifiacts.
• If Tupac Shakur had lived longer, then the world would contain more beautiful artifacts.
More generally, where E is a set of events that could have occurred at particular times to make A true, we
can ask about the relationship between the counterfactual Ah!C and the counterfactuals of the form
‘e occurs h!C’ for each e 2 E. Following Briggs (2012) and Schulz (2011), we could say that Ah!C
is true just in case all of these counterfactuals are true. (This choice turns out to be incompatible with
orthodox views about the logic of counterfactuals.) Or following ?, we could say that Ah!C is true just
in case the counterfactuals corresponding to the closest, likeliest, or most plausible events in E are true.
(This choice turns out to be compatible with orthodox views about the logic of counterfactuals.)
There are also counterfactuals whose antecedents are about propositions that are not made true at any
time such as:
• If Gauss’s Law were no longer a law of nature, then Coulomb’s Law would no longer be a law of
nature.
Our Growing-Block theory has less to say about these counterfactuals. In general, we subscribe to the
view that selected timelines are those created by minimal changes to the actual timeline. A fully general
theory would spell out the concept of ‘minimal change’ even when the change required had nothing in
particular to do with the nomological package, but that is beyond our purview here.
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1. let the selected timelines differ from the pruned timeline in their history—i.e.,
the times before eA,
2. let the selected timelines differ from the pruned timeline in their laws,
3. let the set of selected timelines be empty, or
4. let the selected timelines be impossible.
All four options have unappealing consequences.
Option 1 allows events in the distant past to depend counterfactually on events in
future. Suppose it is not feasible for Leah to get a job teaching Mandarin: she does
not speak Mandarin, and the few teaching jobs in her geographic area will go to
better qualified candidates. And suppose that, when fed the actual timeline and the
antecedent ‘Leah gets a job teaching Mandarin’, the selection function outputs
worlds that have the same laws as the actual world, but differ from it in the distant
past. Now consider an exhaustive state description S of the world 510 million years
ago, in the Cambrian era. In the actual world, S is true, but in the selected worlds
where Leah gets a job teaching Mandarin, S is false. So the truth of S—a proposition
that describes the world at the time of the trilobites—is counterfactually dependent
on Leah’s employment now. While Loewer (2007) attempts to soften the absurdity,
this still seems like a serious bullet to bite.
Option 2 allows the laws of nature to depend counterfactually on occurrent
history. Let L be any true proposition that entails the complete system of laws in the
actual timeline. Then, if Leah had gotten a job teaching Mandarin, L would have
been false. While Lewis (1979) attempts to soften the absurdity of this option, it too
seems like a serious bullet to bite.
Option 3 makes all counterfactuals with infeasible antecedents come out
trivially true. On this proposal, if Leah were to get a job teaching Mandarin, the
sky would collapse, pigs would fly, and two plus two would equal five. We think
this third option is not just costly, but prohibitively costly. Some claim that
counterfactuals with metaphysically or logically impossible antecedents are
trivially true (Williamson 2007; Lewis 1973); even this has its costs (for detailed
discussion, see Nolan 1997; Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Krakauer 2012). To
claim that counterfactuals with infeasible antecedents are trivially true is to
compound the costs, since the infeasible propositions include all the impossible
propositions, and plenty more. Option 3 is the worst of the four options, since it
forces us to affirm all the unappealing counterfactuals affirmed by the other
options, and more.
Option 4 lets the Growing-Block theorist affirm that even if Leah had gotten a job
teaching Mandarin, the laws and the distant past would have remained the same.
However, option 4 seems to force the conclusion that if Leah had gotten a job
teaching Mandarin, something impossible would have happened. (The laws and the
past would together have ruled out her getting the job, yet she would have got it
anyway.)
All of options 1–4 land the branching time semantics in an awkward position—
and indeed, they land a broader class of semantics in an awkward position. Any
selection semantics for conditionals, where ‘‘if A, then B’’ as true whenever B is true
at all selected worlds where A is true, will have trouble in cases where A is
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incompatible with history and the laws of nature. Our theory covers the central cases
where A is compatible with history and the laws of nature, and leaves 1, 2, and 4
open as options for the tricky cases.
2.3.1 Indicatives
Adams (1970) distinguished between indicative conditionals, like
(IND) If Stephanie Kwolek did not invent Kevlar, then someone else did.
and subjunctive conditionals like
(SUB) If Stephanie Kwolek had not invented Kevlar, then someone else would
have.
which now go by the name of ‘counterfactual’. While our account is chiefly aimed
at explaining counterfactuals, it explains features of indicatives too.
It is often remarked that in the future tense, there seems to be no distinction
between indicatives and counterfactuals. Our branching-time theory goes a long
way toward explaining this observation. Where A is a proposition about the future,
the second ‘pruning’ step of our procedure returns the actual timeline, whose
feasible extensions are then selected. So when A is a feasible proposition about the
future, Ah!C turns out to have the same truth value as A  C, on the
supervaluationist semantics we defended in (2012).
The relationship between indicatives and counterfactuals breaks down when the
antecedent A is an infeasible proposition about the future. In this case, our proposed
semantics for counterfactuals requires that (at least where A is possible) the
selection function assign a non-trivial truth value to Ah!C, while the semantics
for indicatives in our (2012) entails that the indicative is trivially true. We think
divergence is plausible in such cases—see the examples in Dorothy (2004) and
Morton (2004)—but philosophers who disagree could tweak the semantics for
indicatives so that Ah!C is true at T iff C is true at every member of a set of
A timelines picked out by the selection function at T—the set of feasible A timelines
if there are some, and the set of least-divergent A timelines otherwise.
So far, Sect. 2 has given an account of (some) counterfactuals and their
relationship to indicatives. We turn now to two objections which claim that our
proposal gives the wrong answers about the counterfactuals within its scope.
2.3.2 Objection: inflexibility
Lewis (1979) raises an objection to branching-time accounts of counterfactuals like
ours: they build temporal asymmetry into the analysis of counterfactuals by fiat. But
this is ‘too inflexible’ since we can imagine and believe in various kinds of time
travel to the past, precognition, and reverse causation.
We don’t think it’s too inflexible. The Growing-Block theorist is already
committed to a deep, metaphysical asymmetry between the past, which is fixed and
unchanging, and the future, which is open. This already rules out time travel to the
past, precognition, and reverse causation. Therefore, the Growing-Block theorist
need not balk at the metaphysical commitments of our proposal.
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2.3.3 Objection: Morgenbesser cases
Another objection to our proposal is that it gives the wrong answers in so-called
Morgenbesser Cases (after an example by Sidney Morgenbesser, reported in Slote
1978). Suppose I bet at e1 that a particular coin will land tails on the next toss. At e2,
a few seconds later, the coin lands heads. My bet has no influence on the mechanics
of the coin toss; the bet and the coin toss take place in two different rooms, causally
isolated from each other. Intuitively, it seems true that
BET If only I had bet heads instead of tails, I would have won!
But according to our proposal, BET is not true. The outcome of the coin toss is fixed
after my decision to bet. So among timelines
(a) that are feasible extensions of the segment of the actual timeline that ends
shortly before my bet, in which
(b) I bet heads,
there will be some timelines in which the coin lands tails.
Our Growing-Block semantics can be adjusted to accommodate the Mor-
genbesser intuition, and at the end of this section, we explain how. However, we
don’t wish to make this adjustment. The Growing-Block theorist should claim that
the Morgenbesser intuition is mistaken, rather than trying to accommodate it.
Notice that when the coin toss is causally determined, but chaotic and so hard to
predict, our account says that BET is true. Any way of modifying the bet that
minimizes violations of the actual laws will leave the determining causes of the coin
toss intact (After all, these determining causes are distant and causally isolated from
the bet).
Only in indeterministic case does our account give the counterintuitive result that
BET is false. However, it is not clear that intuition gets things right in this case.7
Consider the timeline whose present is just before the bet is placed, when there is no
fact about how the coin will land. In that timeline, the disjunction
BET_ Either I will not bet heads, or I will win!
is neither true nor false, but has indeterminate truth-value. Furthermore, the
indicative conditional
BET. If I bet heads, then I will win!
has indeterminate truth value. But if BET is true, surely BET_ and BET should be
true too! Since BET_ and BET are not true, BET should not turn out true either.
We claim that intuition conflates the deterministic but chaotic case, where
present utterances of BET, BET_ and BET are all true, with the genuinely chancy
indeterministic case, where present utterances of BET, BET_, and BET are all
indeterminate. It would not be surprising for our intuitions about chance to be
mistaken in this way. Many of our everyday experiences with chance are with the
deterministic, chaotic kind—roulette wheels, dice, and the like—so our intuitions
7 Phillips (2007) makes a similar point.
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are likelier to give true verdicts in these cases than in unusual, indeterministic ones.
Even in deterministic cases, intuition does not have a stellar track record. We are
often tempted by our gut to commit the Gambler’s fallacy, where we believe a run
of losses make a win on the next turn more likely. Our susceptibility to various
fallacies involving probabilities is a sign that we should treat our intuitions with
caution when it comes to chance.
The reader might remain skeptical.8 The coin toss and the bet are supposed to be
independent—they might happen very far apart, timed so that it is impossible for
any signal to pass between them. Doesn’t our proposal make them counterfactually
dependent? In particular, doesn’t it make both of the following counterfactuals
come out true?
TAILS If I had bet tails, the coin would have landed heads.
HEADS If I had bet heads, the coin might not have landed heads.
A theory that endorsed both HEADS and TAILS would indeed be committed to a
worrying counterfactual dependence between the coin toss and the bet. (HEADS
and TAILS taken together don’t say that betting differently would have influenced
the outcome of the coin toss, but they say that betting differently might have
influenced the outcome of the coin toss, and that’s bad enough.) And our theory is
committed to HEADS. But our theory is not committed to TAILS.
TAILS is a consequence of strong centering—the claim that when A is true at T,
then the only selected A timeline at T is T itself. But according to our theory, strong
centering is false. Even where the antecedent A is true, our procedure for generating
antecedent timelines requires us to prune all the parts of T after the antecedent’s
truth value was settled, and consider all feasible ways of regrowing the shorter
timeline that would have made A true. T will always be among the selected
timelines generated in this way, but it won’t always be unique. The most our
Growing-Block theorist can assert is:
TAILS– If I had bet tails, the coin might have landed heads.
But TAILS, taken together with HEADS, does not commit us to any kind of
counterfactual dependency between the bet and the coin toss.
Our response to Morgenbesser cases is closely related to our response to Lewis’s
inflexibility worry. Both Lewis’s intuitions about the possibility of time travel and
the Morgenbesser intuition about BET rest on the thought that sometimes, when we
consider the antecedent of a counterfactual, we can hold later events fixed, while
allowing earlier events to vary. In terms of our celery metaphor, instead of cutting
off the end of the ‘celery stick’ timeline to remove the dodgy bit where the
antecedent is false, we imagine cutting dodgy bits out of the middle, while leaving
both the earlier bit and the later bit intact. We side with the Growing-Block intuition
that the past is immutable (hence our response to the inflexibility worry) while the
future is mutable (hence our response to the Morgenbesser worry).
8 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing the objection.
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If the reader is still unconvinced, our formal semantics can be modified to
accommodate the Morgenbesser intuition, the Lewis intuition, or both. We can
accommodate the Lewis intuition by replacing our selection function with one based
on overall similarity of timelines—as Lewis himself suggests for worlds (Lewis
1979). Likewise, we can accommodate the Morgenbesser intuition by modifying
steps 2 and 3 in our characterization of the selection function to yield a new
procedure for evaluating a counterfactual of the form Ah!C.
1. Find a time eA, located shortly before the beginning of the span [that A is
about].
2*. Remove all the parts of the timeline after eA—thus generating a pruned timeline
that represents the concrete block the way it was before it grew large enough
furnish a falsemaker (or truthmaker) for the antecedent. But keep a list of
propositions L which are true of the times after eA, and which are to be held
fixed—perhaps all those propositions causally independent of A.
3*. Consider all the feasible extensions of this shorter timeline—all the ways the
concrete block might have grown—in which A is true and in which all the
propositions in L are true. The timelines generated by this method are our
selected timelines.
4. If C is true in all of the resulting timelines, then Ah!C is true in the original
timeline; if C is false in all of the resulting timelines, then Ah!C is false in
the original timeline; otherwise, Ah!C is neither true nor false.
Both maneuvers come at a cost, however. Our preferred characterization of the
selection function secures a tight link between indicative and counterfactual
conditionals. Lewis’s modification breaks the link in cases where the most similar
timelines to the actual timeline at which the antecedent is true have different pasts
(and are therefore not feasible). Our Morgenbesser modification breaks the link in
cases where the truth of the consequent is affected by an event whose occurrence
was determined later than the antecedent, but by a different causal route.
So we are inclined to the simpler semantics, which gives the traditional answer
about BET in deterministic cases, and a slightly surprising answer about BET
indeterministic cases. All this talk of indeterminism, however, might lead the reader
to wonder how we deal with the nomological modality of chance.
2.4 Chance
So far we have divided propositions into three categories: the true, the false, and the
indeterminate. But there are distinctions among indeterminate propositions. Some,
while not quite true, are overwhelmingly likely. To take a practical example,
consider the disposal of nuclear waste. The IAEA safety guide on the classification
of nuclear waste (IAEA 2009, 4–5) distinguishes six level categories. For low level
waste, the IAEA requires ‘robust isolation and containment for up to a few hundred
years’, followed by ‘disposal in engineered near surface facilities’. For high level
waste, the IAEA requires ‘disposal in deep, stable geological formations usually
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several hundred metres or more below the surface’ This is presumably because
somebody with a fresh container of low level waste is justified in asserting
LLW This low level waste will decay within 200 years to a relatively safe level of
activity concentration.
while somebody with a fresh container of long-lived nuclear waste is not justified in
asserting
HLW This high level waste will decay within 200 years to a relatively safe level
of activity concentration.
But assuming that radioactive decay is fundamentally indeterministic, and that
these decisions take place at the present time, both LLW and HLW express
propositions with indeterminate truth values. What, then, explains the difference
between them? The answer seems to lie in their different objective chances. To
make sense of this difference, the Growing-Block theorist will need an account of
objective chance.9
They might borrow some basic insights from Lewis (1994), who draws a
connection between chances and laws. We suggest that the laws include not just
deterministic claims, but additional history-to-chance conditionals of the form ‘‘If
H, then CH’’, where H is a complete proposition about history up to a certain time,
and CH is a proposition about chances at that time. (Lewis requires that the
conditional be ‘‘strong’’ in its modal import; we can accomplish this by saying that
it is a material conditional that is true as a matter of law.) And we place another
consistency requirement on laws: where the laws entail a history-to-chance
conditional H  ðchð/Þ[ 0Þ, they do not entail :ðH ^ /Þ.
We will follow Lewis in relativizing chances to both worlds and times. The
chances are contingent, hence relative to a world. (For example, suppose a physicist
has trapped a positively charged ytterbium ion in an excited 2Po
1=2 state. With
probability 0.995, the ion will decay from the excited state back to the ground state;
with probability 0.005, it will get stuck in a ‘metastable’ state (Olmschenk et al.
2009). But suppose the ion had instead started in the metastable state. Then its
probability of decaying to the ground state would have been 0, and not 0.995.) The
chances are also changeable, hence relative to a time. (In the ion example, if the ion
does get stuck in the metastable state, its chance of decaying back to the ground
state will drop to from 0.995 to roughly 0).
The Growing-Block theorist can achieve both world-relativity and time-relativity
by indexing chances to timelines (worlds with a built-in present). At a first pass, we
can say the chance function chT at a timeline T assigns a number between 0 and 1 to
9 Notice that not all chances are problematic for the Growing-Block theorist. Many deterministic systems
exhibit stable probabilities that are good deservers for the name ‘objective chance’—though see Schaffer
(2007) for a contrary argument. It is only indeterministic chances that pose a problem (if such things
exist). But suppose that our world is both indeterministic and chancy. What can the Growing-Block
theorist say about indeterministic chance?
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each of the timeline’s feasible extensions.10 Where T is a timeline and T is a
feasible extension of T, chTðT
Þ measures T’s objective chance. The greater an
ersatz timeline’s chance at the actualized timeline, the more likely it is to come to
represent the concrete block.
The Growing-Block Theorist needs the chances to be well-behaved; in particular,
where some options form a partition (that is, an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive
alternatives), their chances should add up to 1. But what is a partition, understood
things in terms of timelines? Unlike ordinary possible worlds, timelines are not
mutually exclusive. Where one timeline is an extension of another, there is a sense
in which the two distinct timelines are compatible: both may come to represent the
same concrete block in different phases of its growth. So while the feasible
extensions of a timeline exhaustively represent ways that the timeline could grow,
they don’t compose a set of mutually exclusive alternatives.
Where T is a timeline, we can define a partition A on T as any set of timelines
such that
(i) For all T 2 A, T is an extension of T,
(ii) For all T;T 0 2 A, T is not an extension of T 0, and
(iii) For every T that is an extension of T, there exists a T 0 2 A such that either T
is an extension of T 0, or T 0 is an extension of T.
In intuitive pictorial terms, if you take the ersatz tree structure generated by T and
lop off some of its branches, the remaining limbs constitute a truncated tree. Any
path that stretches all the way to the cut, or to a leaf that was not lopped off,
represents an alternative timeline. Figure 3 depicts two ways of generating a
partition on a tree; in each image, the partition is the set of all timelines that extend
from the root of the tree to the wavy line.
Earlier Later Earlier Later
Fig. 3 Two ways of generating a partition
10 We will need to make two discreteness assumptions, in order to ensure that our first pass works. First,
we assume that time is discrete: between any two times on a timeline, the number of intermediate times is
finite. Second, we assume that the possibilities are discrete: no timeline has more than finitely many
extensions which are longer than it by only one ersatz time. We believe that our account could be
generalized using measure theory, but we want to get the simple case right first.
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Given this definition of a partition, we require that chance functions satisfy the
following constraints.
1. For all timelines T and T, chTðT
Þ 0:
(No timeline assigns another timeline chance less than 0).
2. Where fT1; T2; . . .Tng is a partition on T,
Pn
i¼1 chTðTiÞ ¼ 1:
(The chances of timelines in a finite partition always sum to 1).
3. If T2 is an extension of T1 and T1 is an extension of T0, then
chT0ðT2Þ ¼ chT0ðT1Þ  chT1ðT2Þ. (The chances of timelines obey a version the
multiplicative formula: the T0 chance of getting to T2 is the T0 chance of getting
as far as T1, multiplied by the T1 chance of getting to T2.)
Given an assignment of chances to timelines, we can extend the chance function to
assign chances to propositions—or at least some of them. We will assume that
chances attach to tenseless propositions. (So instead of saying that the proposition
that it is nighttime in Kent cycles between chance 0 and chance 1 as the block
grows, we will say that the proposition that it is nighttime in Kent at midnight GMT
on August 25th, 2020 has chance 1, now and hereafter.) And we assume that
chances attach to propositions with the heredity property—propositions that, as soon
as they become true at a time in a timeline, remain true at that time in all extensions
of that timeline. (So the proposition that Sky Masterson rolls six on a particular toss
of the die has a chance, but the proposition that Sky Masterson is in the objective
present has no chance—not even chance 0.)
For any suitable proposition A at any timeline T, the chance of A relative to a






Say that A settles A just in case for every T 2 A, either A is true at T or :A is true at
T. Then the chance of a proposition is equal to its chance at an arbitrary partition
that settles it. Given constraints 1 and 3 on the chance function, it does not matter
which partition we choose.11
11 Sketch of a proof: Consider two partitions A1 and A2 on T, both of which settle A. We can show that
the chance of A is the same whether calculated using A1 or A2.
A1 and A2 will have a meet A^ ¼ fT
 2 A1 [ A2 : T
 is not an extension of any
T 0 6¼ T 2 A1 [ A2g.
We can show thatA^ is a partition that settles A.A^ satisfies each clause in the definition of a partition.
(i) A^  A1 [ A2. Since A1 and A2 satisfy (i), so does A^.
(ii) Guaranteed by the definition of A^.
(iii) Suppose T is an extension of T. Then either T 2 A1, or T 2 A2. Since A1 and A2 satisfy (iii), T
must either be an extension of some timeline in A1, an extension of some timeline in A2, or a
timeline with extensions in both A1 and A2. In the first two cases, T is an extension of some
timeline in A^ (since every timeline in A1 [ A2 is an extension of A^, and extension is transitive).
In the third case, T has an extension in A^ (namely itself). Thus, for any arbitrarily chosen T 2 A^,
A^ contains either a timeline that extends T
 or that is extended by T.
Furthermore, A^ settles A, since every timeline in A^ is either in A1 or in A2, both of which settle A.
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Constraints 1–3 guarantee that the chances of propositions satisfy the
Kolmogorov axioms12:
Non-Negativity For all propositions A such that chTðAÞ is defined, chTðAÞ 0.
(Every proposition has a chance greater than or equal to 0.)
Tautology If (A) is a necessary truth, then chTðAÞ ¼ 1.
(All necessary truths have chance 1.)
Footnote 11 continued
We can then create a series of partitions from A1 to A^ each of which gives the same chance for A at
T. Number the timelines in A^ A1 as T1;T2; . . .Tn, and let us define recursively:
Bi ¼fT
 2 Ai : T
isanextensionofTig
Aiþ1 ¼ðAi [ TiÞ  Bi









Þ ¼ chT ðTiÞ








Þ  vT ðAÞ




Þ  vT ðAÞ þ chT ðTiÞ  vT ðAÞ
Since A^ settles A, A is either true in Ti (and by heredity, every timeline in Bi) or false in Ti (and by




Þ  vT ðAÞ ¼ chT ðTiÞ  vT ðAÞ
so that chT ðAÞ is the same whether calculated using Ai or Aiþ1, for arbitrary i. Thus chT ðAÞ is the same
whether calculated using A1 or A_. By parity of reasoning it is the same whether calculated using A2 or
A_, and by transitivity of identity, it is the same whether calculated using A1 or A2.
12 Non-Negativity follows from constraint 1, and the fact that a sum of non-negative numbers is always a
non-negative number.
Tautology follows from 2, together with the observation that a necessary truth is true in every timeline
in every partition.
Finite Additivity follows from 2, together with the assumption that every proposition will be settled in
a finite amount of time. The chance of A _ B is the sum of the chances of the timelines at which A _ B is
true in any partition that settles A _ B. Given our finiteness assumption, some such partition will settle A
and settle B. Every timeline where A _ B is true will be one where either A is true or be is true. Where A
and B are incompatible propositions, no timeline in the partition will be one where both A is true and B is
true. So within the partition, the timelines where A _ B is can be divided without remainder into those
where A is true and those where B is true. Now assumption 2 guarantees that the chance of A _ B is the
sum of the chance of A and the chance of B.
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Finite Additivity Where A and B are incompatible propositions, chTðA _ BÞ ¼
chTðAÞ þ chTðBÞ. (The chance of a disjunction of two exclusive alternatives
equals the sum of their chances.)
How does all of this help with the LLW and HLW examples that motivated our
discussion of chance? We can treat the chances of propositions as generalized truth
values. This enables us to distinguish among indeterminate propositions in a more
fine-grained way, according to their degrees of truth.
At any given time, each tensed proposition can be associated with a tenseless
one. (For example, on January 1st 2001, the tensed proposition there will be a sea
battle tomorrow corresponds to the tenseless proposition there is a sea battle on
January 2nd 2001.) We can say that the truth value of a tensed proposition at a time
equals the chance of the corresponding tenseless proposition. Since LLW is
associated with a high-probability tenseless proposition, it is close to true; since
HLW is associated with a low-probability tenseless proposition, it is close to false.
Assuming that what is guaranteed by the past and the laws has chance 1, our
supervaluationist theory of truth falls out as a special case.
A link between chance and truth would explain the connection between chance
and partial belief. Someone omniscient—who knows all the basic facts there are to
know—should believe propositions to the extent that they are true. Likewise,
someone who is omniscient by the lights of the Growing-Block theory—who knows
everything about the past, the present, and the laws—should believe propositions to
the extent that their chance is high. Thus, identifying chance with degree of truth
explains the claims of Ha´jek (ms) and Pettigrew (2012) that while full belief aims
toward truth, partial belief aims toward matching the chances. Furthermore,
someone who is ignorant about a proposition should believe it to the extent that its
subjectively expected chance is (i.e., expected truth value) is high, as the Principal
Principle requires (see Lewis 1980). Thus, identifying chances to degrees of truth
provides a natural explanation of their epistemic role.
2.4.1 Comparison with Storrs McCall’s view
Our view is similar to Storrs McCall’s view of probability in a branching time
framework (McCall 1994). And indeed, the reader who prefers McCall’s view of
chance might substitute it for ours while leaving the rest of our theory intact. But we
will argue that our view has a number of advantages.
McCall holds that the chance of a proposition A at a time e is equal to the ratio
between the number of branches passing through e on which A is true, and the total
number of branches passing through e. Our theory, like McCall’s, can be seen as
assigning weights to sets of branches in a branching model structure. However, we
hold that the chance of a set of branches is not a ratio, but a measure.
McCall’s ratio theory is vulnerable to a number of objections, which the measure
theory gives new ways of circumventing. First, it seems as though there could be
irrational chances (such as the chance that a dart hits a circle inscribed in a square
dart board, where its probability of hitting each part of the dartboard is proportional
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to that part’s area. But irrational numbers by definition cannot be expressed as
ratios.
McCall has a proposal for accommodating irrational probabilities. We can
imagine trials like the dart trial (or the quantum mechanical trials that McCall
envisions) as infinite ‘decenary’ trees, which branch into ten at each uncertain
juncture. Consider an arbitrary real number r in decimal expansion; we can design
an infinite tree that assigns probability r to some proposition A. Where r1 is the first
digit of r, that the first time the tree branches, r1 of the branches decide that A is true,
9 r1 of the branches decide that A is false, and on the remaining branch, A is
undecided. Where r2 is the second digit in r, the undecided branch divides into r2
branches that make A true, 9 r2 branches that make A false, and so on.
This model gets the right formal results, but at a cost. Many of the events that
McCall is attempting to model (quantum measurements with two possible
outcomes) appear to be single-shot trials rather than sequential trials—it is not as
though a given quantum measurement has separable beginning, middle, and end
phases. But McCall’s decenary trees represent them as infinite sequences of trials.
This may be a harmless artifact of the representation rather than a serious hazard—
but it’s an obstacle that we can avoid altogether by viewing chance as a measure.
A second problem for McCall is that there may be too many outcomes for the
ratio theory to make sense. Consider again a dart with a point-sized tip, about to be
thrown at a dart board. Since there are infinitely many points on the dart board, it is
dubious whether the concept of a ratio makes sense. The set of points on the left
hand of the dart board is equal in number to the set of points on the whole dart
board, but this does not (presumably) entail that the chance that the dart lands on the
left-hand side of the board is equal to the chance that the dart hits the board at all.
Moreover, McCall’s method will not help, since the number of points on the dart
board is uncountable. Our current framework is not equipped to deal with such
infinite cases either, but it is easier to see how our theory might be generalized; after
all, measures can be generalized to infinite spaces while counts cannot.
A third problem is that McCall’s theory presents particular difficulties when
combined with our view of ersatz timelines. Imagine a timeline in which a
genuinely chancy coin is about to be tossed, and will land either heads or tails.
Suppose that neither outcome subdivides into more than one feasible possibility.
Does it follow that the coin is unbiased? It does not seem to—even if the coin were
biased, there would still be two possible outcomes, heads and tails, with different
probabilities. But we run into trouble when we combine McCall’s theory with the
view of that timelines are ersatz possible worlds. We could posit multiple
indiscernible concrete timelines to make the numbers come out right, but there are
no distinct but discernible ersatz timelines. Adding McCall’s ratio theory to the our
view of ersatz timelines yields the result that the chance of heads must be 1/2, since
exactly one of the two possible outcomes is a heads outcome.
While our view boasts advantages over McCall’s view, both theories of chance
have the power to significantly strengthen our overall Growing-Block theory of the
nomological package. Where before our model flattened the distinction between the
overwhelmingly likely and the overwhelmingly unlikely—treating both as equally
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indeterminate—we can now assign chances and credences to future possibilities, or
counterfactual ones.
2.5 Dispositions and causation
There are two key elements of the nomological package we have not yet addressed:
dispositions and causation. Each of these might fit into one of two places in our
picture: either at the bottom of our explanatory hierarchy, as a lawmaker; or at the
top, as something with a counterfactual analysis. There is also a third possible place
for causation: it might be tightly coupled with feasibility in a way that enables it to
explain the growth of the block. The placement of causation and dispositions in the
hierarchy is independent. Let us begin with dispositions.
2.5.1 Dispositions
We often appeal to dispositions in order to explain events. We might explain why
the cricket ball broke the window by appealing to a feature of windows—that they
are breakable—or a feature of cricket balls—that they are disposed to break fragile
things when moving at speed. This is very useful. Not only does it help us explain
past events, like the breakings of windows, but it helps us plan for the future: when
we play cricket near windows, perhaps a tennis ball would be better than a wooden
ball, or, when we install windows near the cricket field, we should also install
protective netting.
How are dispositions connected to the rest of the nomological package? We see
two options. First, dispositions might be susceptible to a reductive analysis in terms
of counterfactuals (see Choi 2008). This analysis may be holistic: even if the
dispositions of the cricket ball cannot be analyzed in terms of counterfactuals about
the cricket ball, the counterfactual truths about the universe might determine the
dispositions of everything in the universe. Alternatively, dispositions themselves
could be lawmakers, and could ground facts about laws, counterfactuals and other
elements of the nomological package.
Both possibilities—that dispositions ground laws (and thereby feasibility and
counterfactuals), and that counterfactuals ground dispositions (and are in turn
grounded by laws and feasibility)—posit a tight modal connection between
counterfactuals and dispositions. This renders our proposal susceptible to an
objection from (Mumford and Anjum, ms, 175), who deny the existence of any such
connection. They argue that the dispositional modality is sui generis and irreducible.
We can reconstruct two arguments from their manuscript: one for the conclusion
that counterfactuals cannot ground dispositions, and one for the conclusion that
dispositions cannot ground laws.
Consider first the case that counterfactuals cannot ground dispositions. Mumford and
Anjum reject a reductive analysis of dispositions in terms of counterfactuals because,
they claim, dispositions always allow a chance that something else will interfere.
On one way of understanding this claim, we sympathise. If I tell you that the
window is fragile and the cricket ball is hard, I have not said enough to establish that
the window would shatter if struck by the cricket ball. Perhaps if the window were
The future, and what might have been
123
struck by the cricket ball, some outside intervention would prevent the breaking: the
cricket ball would be deflected by a passing bird, or fly in at a fortuitous angle and
strike one especially strong point in the glass, or an agile custodian would step in
and reinforce the window with just the right protective backing, or … At best, the
connection between the disposition claim and the corresponding counterfactual
holds only ceteris paribus.
But the claim that facts about dispositions are grounded by facts about
counterfactuals is not the claim that facts about dispositions are grounded only by
the facts about some restricted set of counterfactuals. The dispositions of the cricket
ball and the window need not be grounded only in counterfactuals about the window
and the ball. Rather, the facts about dispositions could be grounded by all the facts
about counterfactuals: the window’s fragility may be grounded partly in the fact that
if the ball were to strike the window and a passing bird were to deflect it only
slightly, then the window would still break.
Mumford and Anjum might push back: some dispositions are stronger than
others: a sledgehammer can have a stronger disposition to crack a walnut than a
shoe, even if both succeed in cracking it. But how could there be a counterfactual
analysis of dispositions’ comparative strength? We propose that comparative
strength can be explained in terms of counterfactual robustness; there are more
counterfactually close possibilities where we succeed in cracking the walnut with a
sledgehammer than counterfactually close possibilities where we succeed in
cracking it with a shoe. We need not claim that humans will be in a position to know
all the truths about counterfactuals, even in principle, as long as whatever grounds
the facts about the counterfactuals also grounds the facts about dispositions.
Now consider the argument against our second option—that dispositions are
lawmakers. Mumford and Anjum claim that dispositions cannot necessitate: the
fragility of the window and the hardness of the cricket ball cannot ground a
necessary connection between the cricket ball’s striking the window and the
window’s breaking. There is always a possibility that something could interfere
between the striking and the breaking. Although the dispositions of the cricket ball
and the window may ground something, they cannot ground anything with the
strength of a law—i.e., a necessary universal generalization.
Weagree that the dispositions of thewindowand the cricket ball alone are not enough
to establish a necessary connection between the cricket ball’s striking the window and
the window’s breaking. But this is not enough to show that the dispositions (in general)
are unfit to ground the laws (in general).Again, if there is grounding here, it is likely to be
global: the facts about all dispositions of past and present things (including totality facts)
are enough to ground necessary connections between past and present events and future
ones. Taken together, the dispositional facts about the past and present do necessitate—
they rule out some future courses of events as infeasible.
2.5.2 Causation
We will consider one last element in the nomological package: causation. Hall
(2004) identifies two concepts of causation in the philosophical literature, which
seem to fit into different places in our grounding hierarchy.
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One concept of causation is counterfactual (see Menzies 2014 for an overview).
Counterfactual theories of causation have been invoked to explain the temporal
asymmetry of causation, our ability to manipulate effects through their causes, and
the nature of causal explanation. Such theories would place counterfactuals at the
top of our grounding hierarchy, to be analyzed in counterfactual terms.
The other concept of causation, captured by process theories, characterizes
causation as a sort of production or necessitation that cannot be captured by
counterfactuals alone. According to these theories, causation consists in the transfer
of a mark (Salmon 1984) or quantity (Skyrms 1980; Dowe 1992; Salmon 1994)
across a spatiotemporally connected region. Process theories distinguish between
genuine causation on the one hand (which requires a continuous line along which
causes and effects interact); and omission (e.g., a condemned building remaining
intact because the demolition team didn’t show up), prevention (e.g., a building’s
being condemned because the owner failed to perform necessary maintenance and
refurbishment) and pseudo-causation (e.g., the shadow of a wall appearing to
crumble when ‘hit’ by the shadow of a wrecking ball) on the other.
One place to locate process causation in our hierarchy is above the laws, and
below feasibility: causal connections are constrained by the laws, and in turn
constrain what is feasible. This would allow us to explain causal processes by
appeal to the laws. It would also enable causation to fulfill the role envisioned by
Schaffer (2004) of underpinning the selection function used to generate verdicts
about counterfactual dependence.13
But there is another way to combine process theories with the Growing-Block
theory: we might claim that causation is what enables the block to grow. The laws in
our model constrain how time passes, provided it does (only those possibilities
which are feasible can be actualized), but don’t we need an additional ingredient to
guarantee that time will pass? Some Growing-Block theorists, like Broad (1923),
deny that any such additional ingredient is needed, claiming that the growth of the
block is primitive. Others, like Mackie (1980) hold that what we need is causation,
which turns the potentiality of the future into the actuality of the past by bringing
more of the concrete Growing-Block into existence.
On this third interpretation, causation is intimately connected with feasibility,
explaining why the block grows in exactly the way it does. One could understand
this as causation (together with the laws) grounding feasibility—the feasible
timelines are just the ones that correctly describe forms that causation might compel
the block to take in accordance with the laws. Alternatively, one could understand
this as feasibility grounding causation—causation is what will inevitably push the
block from something that actualizes the current timeline to something that
actualizes another feasible timeline. Since either description seems apt, we have
drawn this possible relationship between causation and feasibility as an undirected
edge in Fig. 2 (Sect. 2).
13 Schaffer suggest that we embrace circularity, and also give a counterfactual analysis of causation. But
as he notes, this circularity is not mandatory.
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There are three places, then, where causation might fit into the Growing-Block
theory: it might be grounded by relations of counterfactual dependence; it might be
grounded by the laws and ground feasibility (and thereby ground counterfactual
dependence); or it might be intimately connected with feasibility in a way that
explains the growth of the block itself. Perhaps there are even multiple entities
called ‘causation’, with each fitting into a different place. We do not pretend to have
a complete analysis, but we have cleared a space (or three) for causation in a non-
Humean Growing-Block theory.
2.6 Odds and ends
We have unpacked all the items that philosophers typically bundle into the
nomological package, but theremight bemore rattling around inside. The nomological
package is not merely a heterogenous list of categories, but a set of categories that
share a certain modal character. Might there be other categories with this modal
character too? We propose a few interesting candidates for further investigation.
For the Growing-Block theorist, persistence might be modal in the relevant sense.
Mackie (1980, 221) says that ‘‘basic laws of working are, in part, forms of
persistence’’; persistence is necessary to explain the continued operation of
underlying processes, and the continued existence of objects.
Structural equations, a recent arrival on the philosophical scene, also seem qualified
to be part of the nomological package. These seem to have the same dual character as
dispositions and causation; some authors place them at the top of our grounding
hierarchy, assuming that they are shorthand for sets of counterfactuals (Hitchcock
2001); while others place them near the bottom of our grounding hierarchy, and try to
analyze counterfactuals in terms of them (Hiddleston 2005; Pearl 2009).
We aim to break new ground in this paper, and that inevitably leaves uncertainty
about the shape of the landscape. This paper is therefore, in part, an invitation to join
us in exploring. We have drawn attention to persistence and structural equations
because they are neglected parts of the nomological package that deserve more
attention. We hope that readers will take up our invitation to investigate them further.
3 Conclusion
We have shown that five important elements of the nomological package—laws,
counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem
for the Growing-Block view. Taking laws as primitive, we have shown that the
Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a
natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We have shown how
objective chances might ground a more fine-grained concept of feasibility, and
furnished a few places in the structure where causation and dispositions might fit.
There are a few outstanding problems for our account, which deserve further
research. The account doesn’t yet provide a fully general semantics for counter-
factuals. It’s somewhat open-ended what should be included in the nomological
package, and we haven’t yet pinpointed where causation and dispositions belong.
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Nonetheless, we have made considerable headway. The Growing-Block view
provides the resources to explain the close link between modality and tense, so that
it predicts modal change as time passes. It brings various elements of the
nomological package together. It provides modeling tools that the Growing-Block
theorist can use to capture truths about laws, chances, and counterfactuals in a
unified formal framework—including the link between indicatives and counterfac-
tuals, and the correct verdicts about Morgenbesser cases. It allows us to see where
causation and dispositions might fit in. And this same account lets us capture not
only what the future might hold for us, and also what might have been. By doing all
this, the Growing-Block view becomes a more appealing philosophical theory—one
with a coherent story to tell.
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